Background and Parties

This dispute arose from a 1951 deed conveying mineral interests in Reeves County, Texas. The successors to the original grantees—including Viper Energy Partners LP, COG Operating LLC, Lambert Land Co. LLC, and various members of the Clifton and Parker families—brought a declaratory judgment action against Scott W. Johnson and Florence H. Cummings, successors to the original grantors. The central question was whether the deed conveyed a fixed 1/128 royalty interest or a floating 1/16 royalty interest. For approximately 70 years, the parties and their successors apparently treated the interest as 1/128, but in 2020 the plaintiffs asserted for the first time that the deed actually conveyed a floating 1/16 interest.

The Double-Fraction Dispute

The deed used the phrase "1/128 (1/16 of the usual 1/8 royalty)" in describing the conveyed interest. Under the framework established in Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023), Texas courts presume that when "⅛" appears in a double fraction in a mineral conveyance, it refers to the entire mineral estate rather than just 1/8 of it. However, Van Dyke emphasized that this "presumption is readily and genuinely rebuttable." The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants (grantors' successors), finding a fixed 1/128 interest. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the interest was a floating 1/16. The Texas Supreme Court granted review to resolve the application of the double-fraction presumption.

The Court's Analysis

Justice Young, writing for the Court, held that the deed's plain language rebutted the double-fraction presumption. The Court emphasized that "courts interpreting a deed conveying a mineral estate are primarily concerned with the parties' intended meaning as expressed in the text they adopted." The Court found multiple textual indicators that the parties used 1/8 for its ordinary numerical value rather than as a term of art for the entire mineral estate. Specifically, the granting clause provided for a 1/128 interest, the present-lease clause "stipulated existence of existing ⅛ royalty and provided grantees 1/16 of royalties provided for in said lease producing consistent 1/128 figure throughout deed," and the future-lease clause granted "1/128 portion of future royalties 'given on said land or any part thereof.'" The Court noted that the double fraction appeared "in parenthetical following their future-royalty figure, and parenthetical was not entitled to greater weight than single-fraction product."

The Court articulated the analytical framework for all double-fraction cases:

For all cases of mineral interest deeds using double-fractions, courts begin with the double-fraction presumption that ⅛ used in a double fraction reflects the entire mineral estate, and then carefully and meaningfully assess any textual provisions asserted by a party as inconsistent with the presumption; if no such indicia exist, or if they are readily harmonized with the presumption, then courts will deem the presumption unrebutted.

Here, the Court found that the deed contained "express language, distinct provisions that could not be harmonized if '⅛' is given the term-of-art usage meaning the entire mineral estate," requiring the Court to "treat '⅛' as a fraction bearing its ordinary numerical value and then multiply the fractions to ascertain the conveyed interest."

The Presumed-Grant Doctrine

The Court also addressed whether the presumed-grant doctrine—which allows long-standing, open, and adverse claims to property to override deed language—might apply. The Court clarified that this doctrine "is concerned not with textual meaning but with real-world developments" and requires proof of "(1) a long-asserted and open claim, adverse to that of the apparent owner; (2) nonclaim by the apparent owner; and (3) acquiescence by the apparent owner in the adverse claim." While the Court noted that the parties had apparently treated the interest as 1/128 for seven decades, it emphasized that "none of the elements of the presumed-grant doctrine turn on the interpretation of the underlying legal instrument; nor does the presumed-grant doctrine play any role in interpreting deeds or other instruments." The Court observed that when the doctrine clearly applies, "a court could dispense with the deed-construction analysis altogether," but here the textual analysis was dispositive.

Implications for Practitioners

This decision provides critical guidance for interpreting mineral deeds with double fractions in the post-Van Dyke era. The Court's holding that the double-fraction presumption is "readily and genuinely rebuttable" means practitioners must carefully examine the entire deed for textual indicators of the parties' intent. The presence of consistent single-fraction references throughout a deed, particularly in granting clauses and lease-specific provisions, can overcome the presumption even when a parenthetical contains explanatory double-fraction language. For title examiners and transactional lawyers, this case underscores the importance of analyzing how fractions are used throughout a conveyancing instrument rather than focusing solely on isolated phrases. The Court's discussion of the presumed-grant doctrine also provides a potential alternative argument in cases involving decades of consistent treatment, though the Court made clear that such arguments are distinct from textual interpretation and require proof of demanding elements including open adverse claims and acquiescence by apparent owners.