Beaumont Court Affirms Rule 91a Dismissal of Pro Se Plaintiff's Claims Based on Expired 1950 Oil and Gas Lease
The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a of a pro se plaintiff's fourteen causes of action—including trespass to try title, conversion, theft, and breach of implied covenants—all premised on claimed rights under an oil and gas lease that expired in 1955. McQueen had previously litigated similar claims against the operators in 2017, resulting in summary judgment against him, and had been subject to a permanent injunction since 2014 prohibiting him from approaching within ten yards of any well.
Background and Procedural History
Dwayne McQueen, proceeding pro se, asserted ownership rights to oil and gas interests in Tyler County, Texas, based on a 1950 lease that expired in 1955. The property has been operated by Zarvona Energy LLC and its predecessors for nearly a decade. McQueen's litigation history with the operators extends back to 2014, when Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC obtained a permanent injunction prohibiting McQueen from coming within ten yards of any Anadarko oil or gas well in Tyler County or within 100 yards of the company's field office. After Zarvona succeeded Anadarko as operator in February 2016, McQueen filed a pro se lawsuit in January 2017 against Anadarko and Zarvona claiming that his family owned an interest under the 1950 oil and gas lease. The trial court granted summary judgment for Anadarko and Zarvona in February 2019.
The 2023 Litigation and Rule 91a Dismissal
In 2023, McQueen filed a new lawsuit against Zarvona Energy LLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Occidental Petroleum Corporation, and Amarado Oil Company, LLC, asserting fourteen causes of action: (1) trespass to try title; (2) trespass; (3) breach of express and implied covenants; (4) constitutional violations; (5) suit to quiet title; (6) conversion; (7) theft; (8) non-payment of royalties; (9) fraud; (10) security interest fraud; (11) negligence; (12) tampering with oil and gas equipment; (13) robbery; and (14) larceny. McQueen's petition was based on his belief that he owns rights under the expired 1950 oil and gas lease.
Occidental filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss all of McQueen's claims. Zarvona, JPMorgan, and Amarado jointly filed their own Rule 91a motion to dismiss all of McQueen's claims. The Rule 91a motions asked the trial court to dismiss McQueen's claims because he either (1) pleaded too few facts in his petition to demonstrate a legally cognizable claim to relief, (2) pleaded facts that no reasonable person could believe, (3) lacked standing to assert the claims plead, or (4) pleaded facts and attached exhibits to his petition that conclusively negated essential elements of his claims. The trial court granted the Rule 91a motions and dismissed McQueen's claims with prejudice. McQueen then filed this appeal.
Appeal
On appeal, McQueen filed a pro se brief presenting eight issues, including whether the district court made errors in its findings of facts and application and conclusion of law regarding trespass to try title and trespass claims, whether the district court abused its discretion, whether the district court made a judicial error, and whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish title, rights and interest according to various sections of the Texas Property Code and Penal Code. The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal order.